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Abstract 
On April 13, 2012, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) Chief Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein 
took part in a conference call to discuss the bank’s first quarter 2012 earnings.  
Coming just a week after media reports first questioned the risks taken by JPM 
derivatives trader Bruno Iksil, Braunstein made a series of assertions about the 
trades.  On May 10, JPM finalized its first quarter financial results, which included 
some disclosures regarding Iksil’s trading that were substantially different from 
Braunstein’s statements of April 13.  At issue is whether the regulatory filings on April 
13 and May 10, as well as verbal comments by Braunstein and Chief Executive Officer 
Jamie Dimon on those dates, were potentially misleading to investors and thus 
violated relevant securities laws enforced by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Commission. 





1.  Introduction 
On April 13, 2012, Douglas Braunstein led off a conference call to discuss the first quarter 
2012 earnings of JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPM) in his capacity as the bank’s Chief 
Financial Officer.  After discussing how the various lines of business contributed to the bank’s 
quarterly net income of $5.4 billion, and before turning the call over to Chief Executive 
Officer Jamie Dimon, Braunstein addressed media stories that had recently swirled around 
the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO). 
Just a week earlier on April 6, Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first news 
stories about a JPM derivatives trader named Bruno Iksil, who worked in the CIO’s London 
office.   Iksil ran the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP), buying and selling credit default swaps 
with the aim of hedging some of the default risk to which the bank was exposed.  The media 
articles implied that Iksil was trading such large volumes of certain credit derivatives that 
his activity was single-handedly moving prices in the market to insure against company 
defaults and also exposing JPM to substantial additional risk instead of protecting the bank. 
In his comments to analysts, investors, and members of the media participating on the April 
13 earnings call,  Braunstein commented that the purpose of  Iksil’s trading activity was to 
help JPM manage losses in a stressful credit environment, that trading decisions were made 
on a long-term basis, that SCP positions were transparent to banking regulators and also 
approved by the firm-wide risk management function, and that SCP’s hedging function would 
be allowable under the Volcker Rule.  
On May 10, JPM finalized its first quarter financial results in a Form 10-Q regulatory filing 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and held a business update call in which the 
bank updated some of the statements made in its earlier earnings release and by  Braunstein.  
Whereas the Form 10-Q disclosed that CIO was expected to lose $800 million in the second 
quarter instead of the $200 million profit previously anticipated, Dimon clarified in the 
business update call that the SCP had already lost $2 billion in the second quarter to be offset 
by $1 billion of gains elsewhere in the CIO.  In addition, the Form 10-Q noted that a commonly 
used measure of CIO’s risk was in fact double what was disclosed in the earnings report, and 
Dimon explained for the first time that the dramatic increase in reported CIO risk happened 
because the bank had switched to and then abandoned a new risk model that understated 
market risk and was later found to be inadequate. 
At issue for purposes of this academic case study is whether JPM’s regulatory filings on April 
13 and May 10, as well as Braunstein’s and Dimon’s verbal disclosures on those dates, may 
have violated relevant securities laws. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established during the Great Depression 
to restore confidence in the capital markets by setting clear rules for honest dealing by 
market participants and by requiring securities issuers to provide reliable information about 
publicly offered stocks and bonds.  The SEC imposes certain disclosure requirements on 
financial market participants to foster fair, orderly, and efficient markets.  Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 10(b)-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 make it 
illegal for an issuer to make false statements or to omit material facts in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities. 
The remainder of the case is organized as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 provide a brief overview 
of the structure of the SEC and the disclosure requirements that the agency imposes on 
financial market participants.  Sections 4 and 5 detail possible errors and omissions that JPM 
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made in its first quarter 2012 earnings release and conference call on April 13, and later 
revisions to these disclosures in the final first quarter results and business update call on 
May 10.  Section 6 discusses the impact of these disclosures on JPM’s stock price during 2012.  
Section 7 concludes with the SEC enforcement actions against JPM and certain of its 
employees.  See Appendix 1 for a timeline of key events pertinent to this case. 
Questions 
1. What SEC disclosure obligations was JPM supposed to meet? 
2. Did JPM’s public statements about the CIO losses (particularly those made in 
connection with the 1st quarter 2012 earnings release) fulfill these obligations based 
on information available at the time? 
3. What role can required securities disclosures play in reducing systemic risk? 
2.  Overview of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
The SEC was established during the Great Depression by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
This law, together with the Securities Act of 1933, was designed to restore investor 
confidence in the capital markets by setting clear rules for honest dealing by market 
participants and by requiring securities issuers to provide reliable information about 
publicly offered stocks and bonds.  (SEC Annual Report 2011, 7).  In 2010, the SEC published 
a strategic plan covering fiscal years 2010 through 2015, including the agency’s mission and 
vision statements. (See Figure 1.).  
Operationally, the SEC is an independent federal government agency that is run by 5 
presidentially appointed commissioners, one of whom serves as Chairman.  As of September 
2011, the SEC had about 3,800 employees located either in its Washington DC headquarters 
or in one of 11 regional offices across the United States (US).  Regional offices investigate and 
litigate potential violations of securities laws, as well as examine certain financial institutions 
(investment advisers, investment companies, and broker-dealers, among others). (SEC 
Annual Report 2011, 8-9) The SEC is organized into five main divisions: 
1. Corporation Finance 
2. Economic and Risk Analysis 
3. Enforcement 
4. Investment Management 
5. Trading and Markets 
3.  Relevant Securities Laws 
Consistent with its mission and vision, the SEC imposes certain disclosure requirements on 
financial market participants to foster fair, orderly, and efficient markets.  Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 10(b)-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 make it 
illegal for an issuer to make false statements or to omit material facts in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities. (US Senate Report, 262)  
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Figure 1:  Mission and Vision of the United States Securities  and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Mission 
The mission of the SEC is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; 
and facilitate capital formation. 
Vision 
The SEC strives to promote a market environment that is worthy of the public’s trust and 
characterized by transparency and integrity. 
Source:  SEC Strategic Plan, 1 
 
Under Rule 10(b)-5, disclosures must comply with federal securities laws if they are [1] 
material, [2] made in connection with the buying or selling of securities, and [3] made by an 
issuer who has the requisite scienter (intent). 
First, the US Supreme Court has ruled that information disclosed by an issuer is deemed 
“material” if there exists “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total 
mix’ of information made available”. (US Senate Report, 263)  The courts have concluded that 
information affecting an investor’s decision to buy, hold, or sell a company’s securities, 
including information about estimated earnings, is considered material. 
Second, courts have ruled that a company statement is considered made “in connection with” 
the buying or selling of securities if the statement “is reasonably calculated to influence the 
average investor”.  (US Senate Report, 263).  While SEC-registered issuers must make 
ongoing quarterly and annual public filings, the SEC deems a far broader array of corporate 
communications to satisfy the “in connection with” element, including statements made in 
press releases and even telephone calls made by company management to discuss major 
corporate events and actions. 
Third, the US Supreme Court has ruled that “a plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement 
by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly”.  (US Senate Report, 264)  
Importantly, statements made by company management based on deficient corporate 
management systems are considered to be reckless in nature. 
Courts have ruled that Section 17(a) “prohibit[s] essentially the same type of conduct” as 
Rule 10(b)-5.  However, Section 17(a) is applicable in more situations, since it does not 
require a finding of scienter. (US Senate Report, 265) 
4.  Possible Errors and Omissions on April 13, 2012 
On Friday, April 6, 2012, Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first reports 
about Bruno Iksil, a derivatives trader in the London office of JPMorgan Chase & Company 
(JPM).  Together with a small team in the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO), Iksil ran the 
Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP), which consisted of long and short positions in credit default 
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swaps and other credit derivatives.  As a lender, JPM is exposed to the risk that borrowers 
cannot or will not repay money borrowed from the bank, especially in a stress credit scenario 
such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  SCP’s main purpose was to partially hedge this 
default risk.   (The characteristics of credit default swaps, as well as CIO’s use of these credit 
derivatives in the failed SCP trading strategy, are explored in greater detail in Zeissler, et al. 
2014A.) 
Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal painted a picture of  Iksil trading such large volumes 
that he was singlehandedly moving prices in the market to insure against company defaults.  
JPM was given a chance to respond before the news was published, and the articles included 
the bank’s statements that CIO activities “hedge structural risks” and “bring the company’s 
assets and liabilities into better alignment”, and that the unit’s results are “disclosed in our 
quarterly earnings reports” and are “fully transparent to our regulators”. (US Senate 
Exhibits, 140-144) 
JPM Chief Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein met the same day with Ina Drew, who served 
as JPM Chief Investment Officer as well as head of the CIO.  Braunstein requested a detailed 
analysis of the SCP’s positions and profit & loss potential under various scenarios to be 
completed by Monday, April 9.  The SCP derivatives trader who presented the initial results 
of the analysis explained that the first quarter “attempt to neutralize [the risk exposure of] 
the book had been unsuccessful”, but that the SCP was now “overall risk balanced” with 
expected second quarter results ranging from a $250 million profit to a $150 million loss, 
but with “significantly positive” upside potential if corporate defaults should increase 
materially.   Braunstein continued to receive daily updates from Drew and other CIO 
employees about the SCP’s function and composition.  Though Jamie Dimon, the bank’s 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, was out of the office from April 2 through April 12, he 
was kept abreast of the situation through e-mail.  (JPM Task Force 2013, 61-62, 70). 
On Friday, April 13, one week after the initial Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal articles, JPM 
filed a Form 8-K with the SEC that included the bank’s quarterly earnings release and 
“reported 2012 first quarter net income of $5.4 billion, or $1.31 per share, compared with 
net income of $5.6 billion, or $1.28 per share, in the first quarter of 2011”.  (JPM 8-K 
20120413, 2). 
Although the Form 8-K did not address the media allegations, senior bank management 
commented about the SCP and the London Whale trades during their earnings conference 
call with analysts, investors, and the media that also took place on April 13.   Dimon famously 
agreed with a Bank of America Merrill Lynch stock analyst who characterized the media’s 
concern about the London Whale as a “tempest in a teapot”.  (US Senate Exhibits, 439). 
However, Braunstein provided a more detailed response on the earnings call, including 
several statements that might be considered misleading in nature.  (US Senate Exhibits, 436). 
We invest those [securities] in order to hedge the interest rate risk of the firm as a 
function of that liability and asset mismatch.  We hedge basis risk, we hedge convexity 
risk, foreign exchange risk is managed through CIO, and [mortgage servicing rights] 
risk.  We also do it to generate [net interest income], which we do with that portfolio. 
The result of all of that is we also need to manage the stress loss associated with that 
portfolio, and so we have put on positions to manage for a significant stress event in 
Credit.  We have had that position on for many years and the activities that have been 
reported in the paper are basically part of managing that stress loss position, which 
we moderate and change over time depending upon our views as to what the risks 
are for stress loss from credit. 
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All of those decisions are made on a very long-term basis.  They are done to keep the 
Company effectively balanced from a risk standpoint.  We are very comfortable with 
our positions as they are held today. 
And I would add that all those positions are fully transparent to the regulators.  They 
review them, have access to them at any point in time, get the information on those 
positions on a regular and recurring basis as part of our normalized reporting.  All of 
those positions are put on pursuant to the risk management at the firm-wide level. 
The last comment that I would make is that·based on, we believe, the spirit of the 
legislation as well as our reading of the legislation and consistent with this long-term 
investment philosophy we have in CIO we believe all of this is consistent with what 
we believe the ultimate outcome will be related to Volcker.” (US Senate Exhibits, 436). 
“[W]e also need to manage the stress loss associated with that portfolio, and so we 
have put on positions to manage for a significant stress event in credit.”  
The JPMorgan Chase & Company Management Task Force (JPM Task Force) conducted an 
internal investigation of the CIO losses.  The Task Force report explained “The Synthetic 
Credit Portfolio managed by CIO was intended generally to offset some of the credit risk that 
JPMorgan faces, including in its CIO investment portfolio and in its capacity as a lender.”  (JPM 
Task Force 2013, 2).  However, the SCP traders were never able to produce any 
documentation of what the specific credit risks were, what hedges would be used, how large 
the hedges should be, how to test if the hedges were effective, and so on.  (US Senate Report, 
273). 
To function as a hedge, the SCP should have been profitable in a weak credit environment 
when the rest of JPM was experiencing losses from borrower defaults.  However, CIO Chief 
Financial Officer John Wilmot sent an analysis to  Dimon and  Braunstein on April 11, just 2 
days before the April 13 earnings call, showing that the SCP actually would lose money if 
credit spreads widened in anticipation of increased defaults, with the SCP suffering losses of 
$46 million, $163 million, and $918 million if credit spreads widened by 1 basis point, 10%, 
and 50%, respectively.  (US Senate Report, 278). 
“All of those decisions are made on a very long-term basis.” 
In 2010,  Drew made a presentation to the Risk Policy Committee of the Board of Directors 
that included the mandate, approach, and investment horizon of CIO’s various portfolios.  
The Tactical Asset Allocation portfolio, which included the SCP among its sub-portfolios, had 
the shortest investment horizon of all CIO portfolios.  At a similar board presentation in 
March 2012, the SCP (now part of the International Mark-to-Market Overlay portfolio) was 
again classified as having a “shorter” investment horizon.  (US Senate Report, 270). 
In addition, SCP’s trading activity was often inconsistent with “long-term” decision making.  
For example, beginning in summer 2011,  Iksil bought credit protection on approximately $1 
billion notional value of a specific high yield credit index.  This trade netted between $400 
million and $550 million, equal to CIO’s full-year revenue, but only because 2 of the 100 high 
yield companies in the index filed for bankruptcy before the expiration of the contract just a 
few months later on December 20, 2011.  (US Senate Report, 54). 
Furthermore,  Iksil and his team made over 4,300 separate trades during the first quarter of 
2012, equal to an average of almost 70 trades per day and hardly reflective of a long-term 
investment strategy.  (US Senate Report, 272). 
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 “All those positions are fully transparent to the regulators.” 
Since CIO’s primary purpose was to safely and profitably invest deposits generated by JPM’s 
national bank subsidiaries that were not otherwise loaned, CIO was regulated by the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).  Even though CIO’s use of credit default swaps to 
hedge the bank’s credit risk had existed in one form or another since 2006-2007, the OCC 
only became aware of the SCP in January 2012, because CIO had previously aggregated SCP 
into broader portfolios for reporting purposes.  From January 2012 (when  Iksil began to 
greatly expand the volume and number of credit derivatives traded) through March (when 
the SCP trading strategy was halted due to continuing losses) and into early April, JPM did 
not provide the OCC with certain required monthly reports that included CIO performance 
data and the results of internal reviews of the fair values assigned by traders to their 
derivative positions, yet the OCC failed to request the missing information.  (See also Zeissler, 
et al. 2014E  for a discussion of the breakdown in the regulatory relationship between JPM 
and the OCC.) 
“All of those positions are put on pursuant to the risk management at the firm-wide 
level.” 
JPM firm-wide risk management personnel had only limited knowledge about SCP’s 
activities and had no role in trading the credit derivative positions held in the SCP book.  John 
Hogan, who was promoted from the Chief Risk Officer of JPM’s investment bank to firm-wide 
Chief Risk Officer in January 2012, acknowledged that the April 6 articles “surprised him” 
because he had previously been “unaware of the size and nature of the SCP, much less its 
mounting losses”.  (US Senate Report, 266). (See also Zeissler, et al. 2014D for an explanation 
of why shortcomings in CIO’s risk management were given insufficient scrutiny by senior 
bank management.) 
Consistent with other major financial institutions, JPM uses various risk limits and metrics 
to measure and monitor the risk of its lending and investing activities.  The amount of risk 
taken is measured using various risk metrics, and these amounts are compared with relevant 
limits.  By January 16, 2012, the large derivative positions in the SCP book caused the CIO to 
exceed not only its own Value at Risk (VaR) limit, but also the higher firm-wide VaR limit.  
These VaR breaches continued until January 19, and  Dimon and the members of the JPM 
Operating Committee were notified each day that the firm-wide VaR limit was exceeded.  By 
March 31,  Iksil’s trading had caused CIO to exceed all of the risk limits applicable to the line 
of business.  (US Senate Report, 174-175 and 207). (See Zeissler, et al. 2014C for a detailed 
description of JPM’s use of quantitative risk management tools. 
“[W]e believe all of this is consistent with . . . Volcker.” 
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is also 
known as the “Volcker Rule” after one of its principal advocates, former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker.  The intent of the Volcker Rule is to reduce risk by prohibiting 
federally insured banks from using depositors’ money to engage in proprietary trading and 
certain other high risk activities.  However, hedging activities that decrease, rather than 
increase, a bank’s risk of loss are permitted. 
Although final Volcker Rule regulations had not been implemented by April 2012, the US 
Senate committee investigating the CIO losses asked JPM’s legal counsel if the bank had 
obtained a legal opinion about how the Volcker Rule might possibly impact the bank’s 
business.  JPM’s attorneys acknowledged that no such analysis had been performed.  
However, in a comment letter to the OCC and other bank regulators dated February 13, 2012, 
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JPM had expressed concern that SCP’s asset liability management activities “during the 
financial crisis would have been endangered by the proposed rule”.  (US Senate Report, 287).   
(See Zeissler, et al. 2014G for an assessment of the extent to which SCP’s trading activities 
may have been construed as proprietary trading.) 
5.  Revisions on May 10, July 13, and August 9 
JPM finalized its first quarter financial results on May 10 in a Form 10-Q filing with the SEC.  
The bank reported the same net income of $5.383 billion on total net revenue of $26.712 
billion that it had announced in the Form 8-K of April 13.  (JPM 10-Q 2012Q1, 85).  However, 
JPM had made certain changes to the disclosures pertaining to CIO between the 8-K of April 
13 and the 10-Q of May 10. 
First, JPM acknowledged the increasing difficulties with the SCP, revising estimated second 
quarter earnings for its Corporate segment, which included the CIO, from a $200 million 
profit to an $800 million loss, and stating “Since March 31, 2012, CIO has had significant 
mark-to-market losses in its synthetic credit portfolio, and this portfolio has proven to be 
riskier, more volatile and less effective as an economic hedge than the Firm previously 
believed.”  (JPM 10-Q 2012Q1, 9). 
Second, the CIO received approval in late January 2012 to implement a new VaR model (see 
YPFS case Zeissler, et al. 2014C  for more detail). The new model seemingly indicated that 
CIO’s market risk, most of which stemmed from Iksil and the SCP, was only half the amount 
previously estimated by the old model.  (US Senate Report, 165-185). 
Included in the Form 8-K of April 13 was a table appearing to show that average CIO VaR was 
$69 million in the fourth quarter of 2011 and $67 million in the first quarter of 2012, giving 
the impression that CIO’s market risk exposure at the start of 2012 was about the same as at 
the end of 2011. (see Figure 2).  However, the earnings release did not mention that CIO 
changed its VaR model during the quarter, thereby hiding the fact that CIO market risk had 
nearly doubled. 
After JPM discovered operational and calculation errors in the new CIO VaR model, the bank 
went back to using the previous model.  (US Senate Report, 184-185).  JPM revised average 
first quarter CIO VaR from $67 million in the Form 8-K of April 13 to $129 million in the Form 
10-Q of May 10, noting that the higher revised amount “supersedes the Firm’s VaR 
disclosures included in its Form 8-K filed on April 13, 2012” and emphasizing that the revised 
amount “was calculated using a methodology consistent with the methodology used to 
calculate CIO’s VaR in 2011”, but making no mention of the reason for the doubling of risk.  
(JPM 10-Q 2012Q1, 73). (See Figure 3). 
Just as JPM accompanied its April 13 Form 8-K with an earnings conference call, the bank 
also followed its May 10 Form 10-Q with a business update call.  Dimon was the sole JPM 
participant on the latter call, and he used the occasion to amplify and clarify certain aspects 
of the Form 10-Q.  He disclosed that SCP was in much worse shape than had been disclosed 
a month earlier, referring to the new trading strategy as “flawed, complex, poorly reviewed, 
poorly executed, and poorly monitored.” Dimon also clarified that the $1 billion decrease in 
estimated CIO income for the second quarter (from a $200 million profit to an $800 million 
loss) resulted from $2 billion of SCP market-to-market losses thus far in the quarter, offset 
by $1 billion of realized gains on the sale of fixed income securities in CIO’s primary portfolio.  
Furthermore, Dimon explained that JPM had implemented a new VaR model during the first 
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quarter that the firm now “deemed inadequate”, leading the bank to go “back to the old one”. 
(JPM Business Update Call, 2) 
However, Dimon also used the call to defend JPM’s disclosure of CIO’s problems to banking 
regulators and analysts, stating that “you should assume that we keep our regulators up-to-
date” and that “we try to keep our readers update[d] about what we know and when we 
know it.” (JPM Business Update Call, 12)  Dimon also reiterated eight times that the SCP 
functioned as a “hedge.” 
Soon after May 10, the bank formed the internal JPMorgan Chase & Company Management 
Task Force (JPM Task Force) to investigate the CIO losses, specifically what happened, how 
it happened, and what remedial measures needed to be taken.  The JPM Task Force, which 
was led by Michael Cavanagh (co-Chief Executive Officer of the Corporate and Investment 
Bank), released its findings in January 2013. (JPM Task Force 2013, 1) 
Figure 2: JPM Value at Risk (in millions), as Reported on Form 8-K of April 13, 2012 
 
 Source: JPM 8-K 20120413, 42 
 
124
JPMorgan Chase London Whale F Zeissler et al.
 
 
Figure 3: JPM Value at Risk (in millions), as Reported on Form 10-Q of May 10, 2012 
 
Emphasis added by author 
Source: JPM 10-Q 2012Q1, 73 
 
 
The JPM Task Force uncovered evidence that the SCP traders may not have been accurately 
marking their derivative positions at fair value as required by US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) (see Zeissler, et al 2019B for further detail).  Unlike exchange-
traded securities, credit derivatives trade in a smaller, less liquid dealer market, which 
introduces greater uncertainty and discretion into the valuation process.  The SCP traders 
exploited this uncertainty and discretion to attempt to hide some portion of the losses that 
they incurred during the first quarter.  (US Senate Report, 96-153). 
After interviewing the traders involved, the JPM Task Force doubted “the integrity of the 
trader marks”, and senior bank management decided that they “were no longer confident 
that the trader marks reflected good faith estimates of fair value at quarter end”.  (JPM 8-K 
20120713, Exhibit 99.1).  As a result, JPM management terminated the employment of  Iksil, 
his superior Javier Martin-Artajo, and  Martin-Artajo’s superior Achilles Macris on July 12.  
(Drew had previously resigned on May 13.) 
Management reviewed the valuation concerns with the Audit Committee of the Board of 
Directors the same day and concluded that JPM would have to amend its earnings as a result.  
One day later, JPM announced on July 13 that it was restating its first quarter earnings, 
reducing consolidated total net revenue by $660 million from $26.712 billion to $26.052 
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billion, which in turn reduced after-tax net income by $459 million from $5.383 billion to 
$4.924 billion.  (JPM 8-K 20120713, 2) 
JPM also announced in the same press release that the first quarter financial statements 
previously filed in the May 10 Form 10-Q “should no longer be relied upon” and that the bank 
suffered a “material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting at March 31, 
2012 related to CIO’s internal controls over valuation of the synthetic credit portfolio”. (JPM 
8-K 20120713, Exhibit 99.1)  JPM filed an amended first quarter Form 10-Q/A on August 9. 
(JPM 10-Q/A 2012Q1) 
6.  Stock Price Impact 
One way to assess the impact of JPM and media disclosures about the London Whale events 
is by looking at the performance of the bank’s stock during the relevant time period, 
especially compared with the performance of the KBW Bank Index of 24 large-cap banks 
(including JPM) and of the S&P 500 Index (see Figure 4). 
From a price of $33.25 per share at December 31, 2011, JPM stock increased almost 40% 
during the first quarter of 2012, reaching $46.27 on March 28 (and paying a dividend of $0.25 
on January 4), its highest closing price for the year.  This gain outpaced the increase in the 
KBW Bank Index, which in turn grew faster than the broad S&P 500 Index. 
The initial Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal news stories about Iksil came on April 6, when 
the stock market was closed for the Good Friday holiday.  When the market reopened April 
9, JPM stock fell by only 1%, less than the drop in the KBW Bank and S&P 500 indices on that 
day.  JPM’s Form 8-K filing and associated earnings conference call on the morning of April 
13 had a greater impact, as JPM’s stock price dropped 4%.  Interestingly, the KBW Bank Index 
also fell 3% on April 13. 
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Figure 4: JPMorgan, KBW Bank Index, S&P 500 Index Closing Price/Level (December 31, 
2011 = 100) 
 
Source: Yahoo! Finance  
 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the steepest drop in JPM’s stock price came in May, especially the 
period surrounding the first quarter Form 10-Q filing and business update call on the 
afternoon of May 10 and the announcement on May 15 that Drew was leaving JPM.  The 
bank’s stock decreased 17% during the week that encapsulated these events, from $40.74 
per share on May 10 to $33.93 on May 17.  JPM stock continued to decline, reaching its low 
point for 2012 on June 4 at $31.00, a decrease of 24% since May 10. (US Senate Report, 252) 
Nevertheless, the impact of the London Whale incident on JPM was not permanent, as the 
bank’s stock rose for the remainder of 2012, reaching $43.97 per share by December 31.  
This represented an increase of 32% during the year, slightly ahead of the rise in the KBW 
Bank Index and more than double the 13% gain in the S&P 500 Index.  In addition, JPM paid 
dividends totaling $1.15 per share during 2012. 
7.  Aftermath 
On August 14, 2013, the SEC charged Martin-Artajo and Julien Grout (a junior SCP trader who 
reported to Mr. Iksil) with fraud for failing to mark SCP’s investments at fair value as 
required by GAAP in an effort to hide losses in the SCP book.  (SEC Press Release 2013-154)  
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The Department of Justice announced criminal charges against Martin-Artajo and Grout the 
same day. Iksil had entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the US government and 
accordingly was not charged.  
One month later on September 19, banking regulators in the US and the United Kingdom 
(UK) announced a settlement with JPM.  The Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, the SEC, and 
the UK Financial Conduct Authority penalized JPM a total of $920 million.  JPM was also 
required to admit wrongdoing in certain instances, a rare occurrence in such settlements.  
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission then settled with JPM in October for a penalty 
of $100 million. 
In its part of the global settlement, the SEC charged JPM with misstating financial results in 
SEC filings and with failing to have an internal control system that would have prevented the 
firm’s traders from fraudulently valuing investments and detected such mismarking if it 
occurred.  JPM agreed to certain findings of fact, to cease and desist from future violations of 
the securities laws, and to pay a $200 million penalty. (SEC Press Release 2013-187) 
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Appendix 1: Timeline of Key Events 
2005  JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPM) spun off the Chief 
Investment Office (CIO) as a separate unit to invest the bank’s 
excess deposits.  Ina Drew, JPM’s Chief Investment Officer, 
was appointed head of CIO. 
2012 January 16-
19 
CIO’s Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) breached the Value at 
Risk limit for both CIO and JPM for 4 days.  This fact was 
reported to Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon. 
 February 
13 
JPM sent a letter to the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and other bank regulators, expressing 
concern that SCP’s asset liability management activities 
“during the financial crisis would have been endangered by 
the proposed [Volcker] rule”. 
 March 23 Drew ordered the CIO traders to stop trading the SCP. 
 First 
Quarter 
Bruno Iksil and his team of SCP traders executed over 4,300 
trades, an average of almost 70 trades per day. 
 April 6 Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first 
news stories about the “London Whale”. 
 April 11 CIO Chief Financial Officer John Wilmot sent an analysis to 
Dimon and JPM Chief Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein 
showing that SCP actually would lose money if credit spreads 
widened in anticipation of increased defaults. 
 April 13 JPM filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) that included the bank’s quarterly earnings 
release.  On the earnings call, Dimon referred to the incident 
as a “tempest in a teapot”, and Braunstein made several 
possibly misleading statements. 
 May 10 JPM finalized its first quarter financial results in a Form 10-Q 
filing with the SEC.  The bank reported the same net income 
of $5.383 billion on total net revenue of $26.712 billion that it 
had released in the Form 8-K of April 13.  However, JPM did 
make certain significant changes to the disclosures pertaining 
to CIO between the 8-K and the 10-Q. 
 May 13 Drew resigned. 
 June JPM officials began doubting SCP marks, when the JPM Task 
Force uncovered evidence that traders were criticizing their 
reported marks. 
 July 12 JPM terminated the employment of Iksil, his superior Javier 
Martin-Artajo, and Martin-Artajo’s superior Achilles Macris.  
Julien Grout was suspended (and later resigned). 
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 July 13 JPM restated Q1 earnings, reporting additional pre-tax losses 
of $660 million due to SCP ($459 million after tax). 
 December 
31 
Year-to-date SCP losses = $6.2 billion. 
2013 January The JPM Task Force issued its report. 
 August 14 The SEC charged Martin-Artajo (who directly oversaw Iksil) 
and Julien Grout (a junior SCP trader who reported to Iksil) 
with fraud for failing to mark SCP’s investments at fair value 
as required by generally accepted accounting principles in an 
effort to hide losses. 
 September-
October 
Four regulators in the US and one in the UK reached 
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